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NO. 52 NOVEMBER 2020 Introduction 
Redrawing the Maps in Kashmir 
New Geopolitical Realities in the Conflict between China, India, and Pakistan 
Christian Wagner and Angela Stanzel 
The political geography of Kashmir has changed radically in recent months. The start-
ing point was the Indian government’s decision on 5 August 2019 to divide the state 
of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) into two Union territories. In response, Islamabad pub-
lished a map on 4 August 2020 showing all of Kashmir as part of Pakistan. At the end 
of September 2020, the Chinese government terminated the status quo with India in 
the Ladakh/Aksai Chin region. This indicates a new phase in the conflict over Kash-
mir, in which China and Pakistan could work more closely together. In addition, the 
conflict is being expanded to include a new geopolitical dimension because, for 
China, the dispute with India is now also part of the struggle with the United States 
over the future distribution of power in the Indo-Pacific. 
 
The territorial affiliation of the former 
princely state of J&K has so far been the 
subject of two largely independent con-
flicts: (1) the well-known dispute between 
India and Pakistan; (2) the less well-known 
dispute between India and China over the 
demarcation of their approximately 3,500-
kilometre-long border, which also affects 
Kashmir. Recent developments could lead 
to the two previously separate conflicts 
becoming more intertwined in the future. 
The Indo-Pakistani Conflict 
over Kashmir 
Following the independence of British India 
and the creation of India and Pakistan in 
August 1947, a number of princely states 
initially remained independent, including 
J&K. When tribal warriors from Pakistan 
invaded, with support from Pakistani of-
ficers, the Hindu Maharaja of J&K turned 
to the Indian government for military 
assistance. At the end of October 1947, 
the princely state joined the Indian Union, 
which, in return, sent troops to support 
the Maharaja. The fighting against the 
tribal warriors developed into the first Indo-
Pakistani War, which ended in January 
1949 with an armistice. Since then, the for-
mer princely state has been divided into 
two parts, one Indian and one Pakistani. 
Kashmir has a high symbolic value for 
India and Pakistan in the context of their 
respective conceptions of the state. Pakistan, 
which was founded as a state for the Mus-
lims of British India, claimed Kashmir – 
with its majority Muslim population – as 
one of its parts. For India, Kashmir became 
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a symbol of the secularism and openness 
of the new state to all religious commu-
nities. 
The ongoing Kashmir conflict between 
India and Pakistan can be divided into two 
major phases. The first phase, from 1947 
to 1972, saw the internationalisation of the 
dispute. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal 
Nehru brought the conflict before the United 
Nations (UN) and proposed a referendum to 
decide whether the territory should belong 
to India or Pakistan. Since 1948, the UN 
Security Council has adopted a number 
of resolutions concerning the conflict. The 
tenor of these resolutions is that, firstly, all 
Pakistani troops must withdraw from J&K. 
Secondly, an interim administration, assisted 
by Indian troops, should be set up. Thirdly, 
this administration would have to prepare a 
referendum to be held across J&K. Kashmir’s 
independence was not provided for in the 
resolutions and is rejected by India and Paki-
stan. China did not become a member of the 
Security Council until 1971 and therefore 
did not participate in the UN resolutions. 
In 1948, the United Nations Commission 
for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) was estab-
lished to settle the conflict and monitor the 
ceasefire in force since 1949. In 1951, the 
United Nations Military Observer Group in 
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) took over 
this task. Until the 1960s, Security Council 
veto powers such as the United States, the 
United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union made 
various unsuccessful attempts at mediation. 
The second phase brought a bilateralisa-
tion of the conflict. It began with the Simla 
Agreement of 1972, which followed the 
third war between India and Pakistan in 
1971, in which East Pakistan was split off 
and Bangladesh was founded. At that time, 
Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi failed 
to take advantage of Pakistan’s military 
defeat and achieve a lasting solution to 
the Kashmir issue. Both states agreed in the 
Simla Agreement to deal bilaterally with 
outstanding issues and to establish a new 
Line of Control (LoC) in Kashmir. India sub-
sequently suspended its cooperation with 
UNMOGIP, which continues to monitor the 
ceasefire along the LoC. 
Pakistan continued to try to internation-
alise the Kashmir issue, for example by pro-
voking regional crises such as the Kargil 
War in 1999, by having the Pakistani army 
and intelligence agencies support terrorist 
groups that carried out attacks in the Indian 
part of Kashmir, and by denouncing the 
human rights violations of Indian security 
forces in Kashmir in international forums. 
The international community gradually 
moved away from the UN resolutions. All 
Security Council veto powers repeatedly 
called for a bilateral solution to the conflict. 
In December 2003, Pakistan’s president, Per-
vez Musharraf, also distanced himself from 
the UN resolutions, paving the way for the 
so-called composite dialogue with India. In 
2007, the two sides agreed on a compromise 
on the Kashmir issue that has never been 
made public, essentially enshrining the sta-
tus quo. In 2008, the terrorist group Lashkar-
e-Toiba (LeT), supported by Pakistan’s Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI), carried out an 
attack in Mumbai, which brought an end 
to the dialogue. 
The different positions of India and Paki-
stan are also reflected in the official maps. 
Since India insists that the whole of Kash-
mir joined the Union in October 1947, In-
dian maps therefore show the whole terri-
tory of the former princely state as Indian 
territory. Because J&K has a border with 
Afghanistan in the north, India also sees 
itself as a direct neighbour of Afghanistan. 
Pakistan, on the other hand, saw the whole 
of J&K as a disputed territory – according 
to the terms of the UN resolutions – whose 
status would only be decided in a referen-
dum. Therefore, Pakistani maps have not 
depicted Kashmir as part of its own terri-
tory, even though the regions Gilgit-Balti-
stan (GB) and the formally independent 
state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) are 
de facto ruled by Islamabad. 
The Indo-Chinese Conflict in 
Kashmir 
From the international perspective, “Kash-
mir” is synonymous with the conflict between 
 SWP Comment 52 
 November 2020 
 3 
India and Pakistan. Since the late 1950s, how-
ever, the People’s Republic of China has 
also been an actor in the dispute over the ter-
ritorial legacy of the former princely state 
– a fact that has received little attention. 
India and China are separated by the 
longest disputed border in the world, at 
around 3,500 kilometres. In the Himalayan 
region, it follows the colonial McMahon 
Line and is particularly controversial in 
Kashmir and north-east India. In the late 
1950s, China built a permanent road to 
Tibet through the Aksai Chin region in Kash-
mir. In 1959, Chinese Prime Minister Zhou 
Enlai proposed an exchange of territory. 
This would have given China the Aksai 
Chin region in exchange for giving up its 
territorial claims in north-eastern India, 
now the state of Arunachal Pradesh. How-
ever, the Indian government rejected the 
proposal. After India’s military defeat in 
the border war of 1962, both sides broke 
off diplomatic relations, leaving the course 
of the border unresolved. 
Following their political rapprochement 
after 1988, the question of borders came 
back into focus. The two countries set up, 
inter alia, a joint working group to demar-
cate the border and appointed special 
envoys. Since then, India and China have 
concluded a number of agreements (in 
1993, 1996, 2003, 2005, 2012, and in 2013) 
to increase stability in the border region 
and reduce tensions through confidence-
building measures. The 1993 agreement 
established the current Line of Actual Con-
trol (LAC), which is more of a space of 
mutually accepted patrol routes and mili-
tary posts rather than a “line”. 
The political changes reflected in the 
new maps and territorial claims since the 
summer of 2019 seem to herald a new 
phase in the dispute over Kashmir. 
The “Old” Position of India 
The point of departure for the new conflict 
dynamics was the Indian government’s 
decision on 5 August 2019 to divide the 
state of Jammu & Kashmir into the two 
Union territories of J&K and Ladakh. The 
Map 1 
 
 
Source: Barthi Jain, “Govt Releases New Political Map of India Showing UTs of J&K, Ladakh”, Times of India (online), 2 November 
2019, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/govt-releases-new-political-map-of-india-showing-uts-of-jk-ladakh/articleshow/71867468.cms 
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political leadership of the majority Muslim 
state of J&K had been granted a number of 
privileges upon accession, which later led 
to repeated conflicts between the govern-
ment in New Delhi and the state govern-
ment in Srinagar. Kashmir’s special status 
had been a thorn in the side of the Hindu 
nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) for 
many years. With its decision, the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Narendra Modi was 
fulfilling one of its election promises. In 
contrast to federal states, Union territories 
in India are under the jurisdiction of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs in New Delhi. 
With this decision, which was based 
purely on domestic political considerations 
and communicated in this way to the inter-
national community, New Delhi reaffirmed 
India’s well-known position that all of 
Kashmir has been formally part of the 
Union since its accession in October 1947. 
Thus, in the newly elected assembly of the 
Union territory of J&K, there are again 24 
seats for the Pakistan-controlled part of 
Kashmir. 
The BJP government’s decision sparked 
strong protests in the former state. Above 
all, it was an affront to the moderate par-
ties, which had always advocated that the 
state should remain in the Indian Union, 
regardless of all political disputes about the 
form that autonomy should take. In the last 
state election, in 2014, the voter turnout 
was over 65 per cent, despite calls for boy-
cotts by Islamist parties demanding acces-
sion to Pakistan. Political observers had 
interpreted this as a clear vote for India. 
Pakistan’s “New” Position 
With its new map of 4 August 2020, Islama-
bad underlined its position on the Kashmir 
issue. Pakistan’s national borders encom-
pass the whole of Kashmir, which confirms 
the political claim to the territory. Pakistan 
had ceded the Shaksgam Valley in its part 
of Kashmir to the People’s Republic in 1963 
as part of its political rapprochement with 
China (see Map 3, p. 6). The Aksai Chin 
region claimed by China is marked as “fron-
tier undefined”. This corresponded to the 
position agreed by the two states in the 
1963 treaty. Earlier maps, on the other hand, 
often graphically separated Kashmir – in-
cluding the GB and AJK regions – from 
Pakistani territory to indicate that Kashmir 
is a disputed territory as defined by UN 
resolutions. 
Pakistan has now also changed the 
nomenclature for the Indian part of Kash-
mir. The previously used term “disputed 
territory” was replaced by “Indian Illegally 
Occupied Jammu & Kashmir”. On the offi-
cial map, the reference to the UN resolu-
tions can only be found in the Indian part. 
This implies that the referendum referred 
to in these resolutions only has to be held 
in the Indian part. This may be in line with 
Pakistan’s self-understanding, but the UN 
resolutions provide for a referendum in the 
entire former princely state. 
Finally, the map also includes areas such 
as the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek – in 
the Indus delta – which have been repeat-
edly negotiated with India. The renewed 
claim to the former princely state of Juna-
gadh – located in today’s Indian state of 
Gujarat, which had joined India after a 
referendum in 1948 – was also surprising. 
Ali Amin Gandapur, Minister of Kashmir 
Affairs and Gilgit-Baltistan in the govern-
ment of Prime Minister Imran Khan, an-
nounced in September 2020 that the GB 
region would soon become a province of 
Pakistan. This has been demanded by the 
local population for many years. In early 
November, Prime Minister Khan announced 
that GB would get the status of a provision-
al province. The full integration of GB 
would contradict Pakistan’s traditional posi-
tion, according to which the question of 
Kashmir’s final status would only be decided 
in a referendum. It remains to be seen as to 
how far the status of a provisional province 
can be reconciled with the demands of the 
people in GB. The elections in GB announced 
for November 2020 could provide further 
insight into the future status of the region. 
In Pakistan it is pointed out that the 
announcement to make GB a province of 
its own also benefits China. The lifeline 
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of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
(CPEC) – the largest and most expensive 
single project under the Chinese Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) – runs through the 
GB region. From a geopolitical perspective, 
CPEC is a unique project. Although China is 
Pakistan’s closest ally, it has long advocated 
a bilateral solution to the Kashmir issue. 
But this was more in line with India’s posi-
tion than Pakistan’s. Against this back-
ground, the investments in CPEC after 2015 
could also be seen as support for the status 
quo in Indo-Pakistani relations at the time, 
as it prevailed before BRI began. A stronger 
constitutional integration of GB would also 
indirectly secure Chinese investments. After 
all, the UN resolutions, even if they are only 
hypothetically relevant, require Pakistan to 
withdraw from the territory of the former 
princely state as a precondition for a refer-
endum. Moreover, the Kashmiris could also 
opt for India in this referendum. 
The fact that CPEC runs through the 
Pakistani part of Kashmir is also the main 
reason why India refuses to participate 
in the BRI. China had long been courting 
India’s participation. Because it claims all 
of Kashmir, the Indian government sees 
CPEC as a violation of its national sover-
eignty. 
With its new map, Pakistan is reaffirm-
ing its political claims on Kashmir, but it 
is also moving further away from the UN 
resolutions, despite all statements to the 
contrary. India’s decision to divide J&K was 
a welcome opportunity for Pakistan to re-
mobilise on the Kashmir issue, which had 
been relegated to the background in recent 
years due to economic and political prob-
lems. As a result, the hardliners have gained 
ground in Pakistan as well. Prior to 5 August 
2019, Khan had tried several times to re-
sume dialogue with India, but he has since 
refrained from doing so. 
The continuation of the conflict with 
India is likely to be in the interests of the 
all-powerful army, which has dominated 
foreign and security policy towards India 
for decades. Despite all the economic prob-
lems, Pakistan’s defence budget for finan-
cial year 2020–21 was increased by 11.9 
per cent. 
Map 2 
 
 
Source: Ministry of Defence, Survey of Pakistan. Political Map of Pakistan, 5th edition 
(2020), http://www.surveyofpakistan.gov.pk/Detail/MTUzYWU5ZGItNTA4NS00MDlkLWFlODctNTRkY2JmNWI0Mjg2. 
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China’s “New, Old” Position 
The Chinese government also criticised 
India’s decision of 5 August 2019 and the 
creation of the Union territory of Ladakh, 
which formally includes Aksai Chin. The 
fact that Ladakh is now centrally adminis-
tered by New Delhi made it easier for the 
Indian government to expand the military 
infrastructure in the region bordering 
China. China had a clear advantage here, 
which Indian military experts had repeatedly 
criticised. After all, there had been repeated 
incidents in this section of the LAC in the 
past. Apart from the development of the 
infrastructure, a statement by the Indian 
Minister of the Interior, Amit Shah, may 
have caused annoyance in Beijing. Immedi-
ately after his government’s decision, he 
had reiterated India’s claim to Aksai Chin 
in Parliament. Chinese experts saw the fact 
that Chinese troops had crossed the LAC in 
the Ladakh/Aksai Chin region several times 
since the beginning of May as a reaction 
to the Indian decision of August 2019. On 
15 June, a serious incident occurred in the 
Galwan Valley, in which 20 Indian and an 
unknown number of Chinese soldiers were 
killed (see SWP Comment 39/2020). 
The rhetoric in the Chinese media has 
become much more intense. India is now 
portrayed as a provocateur in the border 
conflict, which legitimises a Chinese 
reaction in the form of military defence 
measures. According to a Chinese survey 
conducted by the party-affiliated magazine 
the Global Times and the Chinese think-tank 
CICIR in August 2020, more than 70 per 
cent of respondents said that India was too 
hostile towards China; 90 per cent supported 
retaliatory measures against India. 
While tensions in the border region con-
tinued, the Chinese side also increasingly 
emphasised the geopolitical dimension, in 
particular the intensified military relations 
between India and the United States and 
their political cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, 
including in the framework of the Quadri-
lateral group (“the Quad”), in which Aus-
tralia and Japan are also involved. 
At the end of September 2020, represen-
tatives of the Chinese government surpris-
Map 3 
 
 
Source: “Mapping India and China’s Disputed Borders”, Al Jazeera, 10 September 2020,  
https://interactive.aljazeera.com/aje/2020/mapping-india-and-china-disputed-borders/index.html. 
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ingly declared that China’s territorial claims 
included the territories of the former LAC 
of 1959. This was China’s first move away 
from the 1993 agreement that established 
the current LAC, whose course was never 
clearly defined. Despite numerous rounds 
of talks in the past, both sides have never 
exchanged official maps of the critical 
areas, including the Ladakh/Aksai Chin 
region. Therefore, mutual territorial claims 
have remained vague. With its new posi-
tion, China resorted to its old one from 
1959, which had not been recognised by the 
Indian government at the time. 
Indian military experts have pointed out 
that since May, violations by Chinese troops 
have focused mainly on regaining control 
of the 1959 LAC areas. According to India, 
China now controls approximately 1,000 
square kilometres of territory previously 
controlled by India.  
Outlook 
In 2000, US President Bill Clinton described 
Kashmir as “the most dangerous place in 
the world”. At the time, this referred to the 
explosive mix of terrorist attacks and a pos-
sible military escalation between the nuclear 
powers India and Pakistan, which was evi-
dent during the Kargil War in 1999 and 
after the attack on the Indian Parliament in 
December 2001. 
The political changes reflected in the 
new maps could herald a new phase in the 
conflict. There is a possibility that the two 
long-standing conflicts in and around Kash-
mir could become more intertwined with 
greater co-operation between Pakistan and 
China against Indian. Politically, this was 
already evident in August 2019, when 
China, in its role as a permanent member 
of the Security Council, secured an infor-
mal meeting of the panel on the Indian 
decision to dissolve J&K. Although the 
meeting ended without result, it was cel-
ebrated as a great diplomatic success in 
Pakistan. 
China’s claims on the 1959 LAC threaten 
the infrastructure that India has built up in 
recent months in some areas. In the event 
of a military escalation, Chinese troops 
could block access to Daulat Beg Oldie. The 
military airfield there is of central impor-
tance for supplying Indian troops on the 
Siachen Glacier. The glacier is the highest 
war theatre in the world, where Indian 
and Pakistani troops have been facing each 
other since the mid-1980s. Apart from the 
possibility that Pakistan and China might 
cooperate politically and militarily on Kash-
mir in the future, recent developments 
have added another conflict component to 
the “world’s most dangerous place”. China 
now no longer sees its border conflict with 
India as a bilateral problem, but as part 
of its geopolitical dispute with the United 
States, in whose camp India is perceived 
to be. This also affects the LAC in the 
Ladakh/Aksai Chin region. 
The Indian government’s decision to dis-
solve the state of J&K has therefore proved 
counterproductive in several respects. Paki-
stan’s protests were to be expected, and 
criticism by Western governments and 
human rights organisations of the massive 
restrictions of freedoms in Indian Kashmir 
is unlikely to have impressed the Indian 
government, nor had it in the past. China’s 
extreme reaction, on the other hand, which 
de facto also called into question parts of 
the bilateral rapprochement of the past 20 
to 30 years and probably caused India a 
permanent loss of territory, had obviously 
not been anticipated by the Indian side. 
India’s purely domestic political decision 
has unintentionally added a geopolitical 
dimension to the conflict, thereby making 
it more international – something that 
Indian governments have so far tried to 
avoid at all costs. 
German and European policy-makers are 
likely to have problems with the positions 
of all parties to the conflict. During her visit 
to India in November 2019, German Chan-
cellor Angela Merkel described the situation 
in Indian Kashmir as “untenable” because 
massive restrictions on civil rights were 
imposed there after the country’s transfor-
mation into a Union territory. Pakistan’s 
attempts to internationalise the conflict 
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will still find hardly any support in Berlin 
and Brussels. Beijing’s efforts to restore the 
current 1959 Line of Control, in turn, will 
not diminish the growing reservations 
about the matter in Germany and Europe. 
Although Berlin and Brussels share an 
interest in regional stability, they have little 
opportunity to influence the parties to the 
conflict. The approach agreed by India and 
Pakistan in 2007 was essentially to establish 
the political and territorial status quo in 
Kashmir. In the new conflict scenario, a solu-
tion between the governments involved is 
likely to be a long way off. Kashmir has a 
different strategic importance for the three 
states. For India, it was, is, and remains a 
purely domestic issue. The new develop-
ments once again offer Pakistan the oppor-
tunity to mobilise nationally and inter-
nationally for its cause. For China, the 
conflict is a new stage in the geostrategic 
struggle, especially in terms of its foreign 
policy: It is wrestling not only with India 
over the future role of both states in South 
Asia, but also indirectly with the United 
States over who holds power in the Indo-
Pacific. 
Dr Christian Wagner is Senior Fellow in the Asia Division at SWP.  
Dr Angela Stanzel is Associate in the Asia Division at SWP. 
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